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“I pay enough taxes already!” Applying economic voting models to 
environmental referendums 
 
Abstract 
Objectives. Models of economic voting have rarely been applied to referendum votes. We 
fill this gap by testing citizens’ voting behavior on environmental policy in relation to their 
perception of the business cycle and general orientation towards politics. Thus, the study 
examines the personal, institutional and economic determinants of vote choice on 36 
environmental bills from 1983 to 2004 in Switzerland. Methods. We apply a logistic 
hierarchical model, where individual characteristics on level-1 are nested within contextual 
determinants situated on level-2. Results. We confirm the crucial importance of the 
individual-level variables education, political affinity, car ownership and urbanity. 
Classifying the electorate into five groups, using open-ended survey questions about 
respondents’ reasons for approval or dismissal of the bills, allows for finer hypotheses 
testing. We show that the individuals’ positive perception of their personal current economic 
conditions has a positive effect on the likelihood of supporting the proposals. In turn, we 
prove the negative, constraining effect of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions on 
approval rates. Conclusions. By applying economic voting models to referendum analyses 
we advance the understanding of citizens’ vote choice on environmental ballots, we show 
the role of context and we propose an original typology of voters’ general orientation 
towards politics. 
 
1 Introduction 
Analyses of votes on environmental issues remain rather scarce in scholarly research. As the 
issue is gaining prominence on political agendas of developed countries more attention is 
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being turned to discriminating factors influencing approval or dismissal of environmental 
ballots. In Switzerland, which has a long record of voting on the environment and where 
direct-democratic instruments allow the people to vote on new laws and constitutional 
amendments, data is more easily to come by. Indeed, studies on environmental referendums 
usually hail from Switzerland and American states such as California, which know extensive 
direct democratic instruments. Most of the research on environmental voting was carried out 
in the public choice tradition which expects voters to maximize personal utility when 
stepping into the voting booth, even when making a choice on a public good such as the 
environment (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975; Fischel, 1979; Kahn and Matsusaka, 1997; 
Thalmann, 2004). We aim to develop a theoretical foundation of voting behavior regarding 
environmental projects going beyond cost benefit analysis. 
Indeed, election outcomes in advanced industrialized democracies have often been 
explained by advancing economic arguments. However, very little attention has been paid to 
the impact of individuals’ perceptions of economic predicaments on referendum outcomes 
(for an exception see Bowler and Donovan, 1998: ch. 4). Early research in voting behavior 
has shown that voters’ choices in elections are heavily influenced by their perception of 
economic conditions – be it their own financial situation or that of the country (Kramer, 
1971; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Since referendums pertaining to environmental issues 
often entail a personal monetary factor and, in the view of many voters, have a considerable 
impact on the nation’s economic performance upon approval, their study is particularly 
appropriate for testing economic voting models. Thus, this paper shows that negative 
perceptions of micro- and macro-economic conditions have a constraining effect on the 
probability of the support of environmental ballots. However, as we maintain, other factors 
going beyond cost benefit calculus matter too (cf. Bornstein and Lanz, in press). 
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Switzerland practices a high level of direct democracy and is characterized as a 
consensus democracy. Its citizens are called up to four times a year to vote on several 
proposals of amendments to the Constitution or new laws which can be initiated by the 
people or are mandatory under the Constitution. They often bear directly or indirectly on 
government finances, spending and public management. For the present paper we analyze all 
referendums pertaining to environmental protection from 1983-2004. Not only is the policy 
domain rapidly gaining prominence on political agendas across the entire globe but 
referendums on environmental protection make up almost a fifth of all referendums voted 
upon in Switzerland since 1981 (Kriesi, 2005). It is thus of crucial importance to understand 
what shapes people’s vote on environmental issues. 
Finally, while voting behavior analyses usually rely on socio-structural data reflecting 
personal traits and preferences, we cannot neglect that a considerable portion of information 
is withheld. As it is, we have at our disposal a database of Swiss post-referendum surveys 
from 1983 to 2004, the so called VOX-data, which not only ask for citizens’ preferences and 
characteristics but also requires them to motivate their voting decision. Thus, we make use 
of Swiss citizens’ stated voting motives in the survey to create a typology of the electorate 
which is rooted theoretically in the literature of economic voting and public choice. This 
allows us to put the motivation groups to the test in a sophisticated multilevel econometric 
model. Most voting analyses neglect the crucial impact the context exerts on individual 
decision-making as only few scholars have included aggregate data on a second level to 
augment the traditional individual-level model (Jones, Johnston, and Pattie, 1992; 
Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Kriesi, 2005; Sciarini, Bornstein, and Lanz, 2007). By 
modeling contextual characteristics in multilevel models we are able to control for 
institutional and economic factors going beyond preference-based assumptions.  
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Following this introduction, section 2 will give a description of the five-fold voter 
typology based on stated motives for approving or rejecting an environmental referendum. In 
section 3 we present the hypotheses, the data and discuss the distribution of the electorate 
into the five motivation groups. Consequently, the econometric model is introduced in 
section 4. Section 5 presents the estimations’ results and their discussion, before we 
conclude the paper in section 6. 
 
2 A five-fold typology of the electorate  
American scholarly research on voting behavior has generally concluded that voters have 
great difficulties understanding ideologies or issues during political campaigns. Similarly as 
in the United States, skepticism remains as to the ability of the Swiss electorate to make 
reasoned decisions (Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1990; Christin, Hug, and Sciarini, 2002). As a 
way out of this cognitive ability-trap citizens are believed to reason their decision in part by 
relying on heuristic cues and shortcuts, i.e. to emulate the behavior of citizens disposing of 
greater political knowledge (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Lupia, 1994). Not only 
does the lack of understanding have detrimental effects on the approval of projects at ballots 
but voters will also follow the elite’s opinion and thus make their choice dependent on the 
direction of the debate in the public arena (Zaller, 1992; Sciarini and Marquis, 2000; 
Sciarini, Bornstein, and Lanz, 2007). Finally, voters might also follow their government’s 
recommendations when casting a vote (Kriesi, 2005) or those of political parties, which 
serve as a reliable and not very costly shortcut to decision-making (Downs, 1957). Following 
this discussion we can define the first group of our typology, namely the Cue-takers. They 
follow their “gut feeling” or short-cuts and cues such as voting recommendations given by 
the authorities or by their reference political or environmental organization.1 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Another way for voters to address complex political choices is to rely on ideologies, i.e. a 
set of personal prejudgments. Even without external cues, voters in our second group, called 
Ideologues, are able to position a proposal relative to their prejudgments and to decide on 
that basis. They explain their vote with a simple slogan, void of sophisticated reasoning. 
Converse (1964: 216) argued similarly in his five-fold typology that ideological respondents 
relied on “a relatively abstract and far reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against 
which political objects … were evaluated”. Ideologues could be in favor of any 
environmental policy without consideration for costs, just as, they could oppose any 
government intervention aiming to protect the environment without thinking about the 
consequences. 
Much of the literature on environmental referendums was carried out in the public choice 
tradition, which emphasizes the role of cost benefit analyses (CBA) on individual decision-
making (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975). Scholars contend that price and income effects explain 
most of the variance and that ideological considerations are negligible (Kahn and 
Matsusaka, 1997). Similarly, the economic voting literature stresses that citizens make a 
vote choice based on their perception of national or personal economic welfare. Although 
the latter strand of literature has been applied mainly to parliamentary and presidential 
elections, we extend the arguments to test how the approach fares when studying 
referendums. The first distinction among CBA-based decision-making must be made 
between “pocketbook” and “sociotropic” voters. Citizens following pocketbook 
considerations watch their personal financial situation closely and, upon this, reward or 
punish the incumbent party.2 Sociotropes, on the other hand, make a decision based mainly 
on the nation’s past economic performance. However, “pocketbook voting will be more 
likely among those citizens who see their own problems as having social or collective 
causes…” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981: fn. 56).3 Sociotropes base their judgment on a rough 
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evaluation of the economy-wide consequences of a proposal, as opposed to the pocketbook 
voters who focus on direct personal consequences. Following this argument, sociotropic 
voting can even be led completely by self-interest when a voter takes the nation’s health as 
an indicator of how her personal welfare is attributable to the incumbent party, but she could 
also be concerned by other people's welfare. We reserve therefore the name of Selfish voters 
for the third group of the electorate, which compares the costs and benefits of a proposal 
mainly for itself emphasizing for instance tax hikes, reduced mobility or a cleaner 
environment.  
Among the sociotropes we differentiate between myopic and future-oriented voters. 
Obviously, current economic conditions are more easily perceptible by the average voter 
than forecasting the future effects a politician’s policy would have on her personal welfare 
(Fiorina, 1981; Erikson, 1989). Thus, we expect the fourth category of voters, the Myopic 
voters, to compare the current costs and benefits of a proposal from a sociotropic point of 
view, emphasizing for instance impacts on employment, budget, or international 
competitiveness. However, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) argue that the electorate 
is anticipating and foresighted rather than myopic (see also Lewis-Beck, 1988: 118-125). 
Indeed, environmental issues encourage prospective sociotropic voting as they are generally 
linked directly or indirectly to questions of sustainability and the security of our future. 
Extending the argument somewhat, we contend that these citizens do not only think of 
national future economic prospects, i.e. economic growth, but also about general questions 
linked to the preservation of resources and the future of our natural habitat when making a 
choice. Our last group therefore, the Anticipatory voters, is believed to compare the future 
costs and benefits of a proposal from a sociotropic point of view too, but emphasizing long-
term impacts of government policy, i.e. issues linked to sustainability, land use changes or 
the impact of a proposal on future national economic development. 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the five groups, their theoretical underpinnings, and 
some examples of responses given. Note that in each group voters can decide to approve or 
reject an environmental proposal depending on how they assess its consequences along their 
priorities and on how they weigh those priorities. Therefore, all groups comprise yes- and 
no-voters. For that reason, attributing voters to a group will not determine her vote but only 
indicate what aspects of a proposal she might emphasize. More control variables and such 
pertaining to the context-level are needed to explain votes. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In the following, we discuss some of the control and context variables used in our 
hierarchical regression models. Early studies in the 1970s, conducted with aggregate voting 
data and post referendum survey data in the United States, showed that environmental 
projects at ballots were strongly disapproved by voters with conservative political views 
(Deacon and Shapiro, 1975; van Liere and Dunlap, 1980) but embraced by those with higher 
education (Fischel, 1979). Those results were confirmed by later empirical studies (Kahn 
and Matsusaka, 1997; Thalmann, 2004; Bornstein and Lanz, in press). One might expect 
younger voters to be more supportive of environmental ballots because they are more 
concerned by long-term environmental changes or because they share post-materialist 
values, but these assumptions were refuted by empirical studies in the Swiss context 
(Sciarini, Bornstein, and Lanz, 2007). Nevertheless, we will control whether respondents 
giving a voting motivation in terms of prospective impacts decide differently when it comes 
to votes on nuclear power. We believe these questions to be particularly salient to 
anticipatory voters since they are hard to grasp in terms of a single lifespan (consider the 
half-life of nuclear waste) and call upon post-materialist ideals. 
Urban voters might be more favorable to environmental policy because they are more 
exposed to nuisances and they value the leisure value of open spaces more than its 
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productive value. On the other hand, caution must be exerted because urbanity is correlated 
with other voter characteristics such as more leftist political preferences and higher 
education and income (Salka, 2001). Finally, a variable pertaining to private transport shall 
control for utilitarian arguments. We know that people possessing one or several cars are 
less likely to accept environmental proposals (Thalmann, 2004), be it because they 
appreciate mobility more or because of the associated leisure. A survey among citizens not 
possessing a car – around 25% of all households in Switzerland – either made a considerate 
choice against private transportation and for the environment (about one third), adapted to 
exogenous factors (e.g. insufficient financial resources, prevalence of public transport in 
their urban area, health-related reasons; about one fifth), or are rather ambivalent with 
respect to the reasons of not possessing a car (Müller and Romann, 1999).  
Furthermore, to be able to provide a general measure of economic conditions close to the 
voters’ interests, we use the change in consumption climate from the preceding quarter. For 
a narrower measure of economic conditions related to environmental policy, we use the 
price of gasoline on a year-to-year basis. We expect both predictors to have a negative 
impact, ceteribus paribus, on vote choice when their values are worsening, i.e. when 
confidence falls or the gas price rises. Finally, as mentioned above, earlier research showed 
that the ballot’s design, such as its comprehensibility and the elite’s position on a specific 
proposal both have a significant impact on choice behavior (cf. Zaller, 1992). 
 
3 Hypotheses and data 
First we test assumptions on personal determinants of environmental voting and on the 
motivation groups in a single-level model. Next we add economic and institutional 
predictors on a second level. This will allow for more detailed hypotheses testing, namely 
the possibility to test cross-level interactions.  
 9
H1 - Motivation groups (Ideologues as reference category) 
1a. When other personal factors are taken into account, Selfish and Myopic voters will vote 
significantly more against the environmental proposals. 1b. On the other hand, Anticipatory 
voters will be more favorable. 1c. Cue-takers will vote in line with their government, i.e. 
rather against the proposals, of which most were introduced by popular initiative.  
H2 - Context variables significantly improve the model’s ability to predict individual votes 
over time. 
2a. A positive change in consumption climate will increase the probability of approval 
because a better position in the economic business cycle promotes voters’ willingness to pay 
for the environment. The contrary applies for the measure of general economic conditions: 
higher gas prices decrease ballot support. 2b. The probability of approval of proposals that 
are unanimously supported by the Swiss elites will be higher.  
H3 - Interaction effects: the same context variables are not equally important for all 
motivation groups. 
3a. Selfish voters making their choice dependent on the change in the consumption climate 
will be incited to vote more strongly in favor of the environmental proposals as the 
consumption climate improves. 3b. When the Myopic voters take into account general 
economic conditions, their rejection of the projects will be offset when gas prices are lower. 
3c. Anticipatory voters are more likely to approve proposals restricting nuclear power than 
the other groups. 3d. Cue-takers will vote even more strongly against all environmental 
proposals when the elites are divided. 
 
The VOX surveys 
Since 1981 a representative telephone survey has been conducted within three to four 
weeks after each national vote (hereafter VOX survey). Each survey interviews 
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approximately 1,000 adults following a uniform blueprint augmented by questions specific 
to each vote. For this study, we pooled the data from 19 VOX surveys bearing on 36 
environment-related policy proposals put to vote over the last 21 years (a complete list of all 
votes is available from the authors upon request or can be consulted at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f//pore/va/vab_2_2_4_1.html). The proposals were voted upon 
during only 19 weekends, as it is usual in Switzerland to bundle referendums. For most 
proposals, voting yes was voting in favor of some environmental improvement; the two 
objects for which that was not the case were recoded accordingly.  
For the present study, there were initially a total of 36,514 observations dispersed over 38 
votes.4 Eliminating respondents who did not participate in the popular vote and those who 
did not answer all personal questions reduces the sample to 18,815 observations. The sample 
is further reduced to 14,989 observations by missing answers to the motivation question and 
by ambiguous answers that did not allow allocating a respondent to any group. After 
inspection of descriptive data, we found that two of our votes in 1984 were badly biased 
with approval rates of around 90%. Unreliable data in the early VOX surveys is known to be 
an often encountered problem, especially with respect to the motivation questions. Thus, we 
decided to delete these two votes which reduced the sample size to 14,633 respondents 
distributed over 36 votes.  
The question in the VOX survey about voters’ motives for casting a ballot in favor or 
against the proposal of the day has hardly been used in past scientific research. It is the only 
open question in the survey, which might explain some reluctance towards its exploitation.5 
We do not dispose of the answers themselves but their recoding by the survey organizers, 
often just a word or two, which prevents us from making all the distinctions we might think 
of. The original question is as follows: “What is the main reason for which you 
approved/rejected the proposal?” Many voters cannot be allocated to any group because they 
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did not answer the motivation question or their answer was coded in an ambiguous way.6 
Additionally, attributing voters to groups was a difficult task as some proposals pursued very 
narrow and issue-specific goals.  
 
Distribution of voters into the five-fold typology 
Table 2 shows how the voters were allocated to the motivation groups outlined above. 
The largest group is that of Myopic voters with 30% of the electorate, closely followed by 
the Ideologues (28%) and the Anticipatory voters (27%). The Selfish voters represent only 
11% of the sample, but that might be related to our a priori that voters concerned by high 
prices or employment loss worry not primarily for themselves and are therefore classified as 
Myopic voters. Anyway, adding them to the motivation groups of Myopic and Anticipatory 
voters yields nearly 70% of the electorate who based its vote on considerations of costs and 
benefits of the proposals.  
Comparing voters who supported and opposed the environmental proposals shows 
clearly that more supporters are Anticipatory voters and more opponents are Selfish voters. 
The other groups are about equally distributed. Next we checked the personal composition of 
the groups in terms of gender, education, linguistic region, urban/rural location and political 
preferences. No category was clearly over-represented in any of the groups, except that 
voters with university education were less often allocated to the Selfish group (7% of them 
against 13% of the voters with minimal education) and more often to the Ideology group 
(31% vs. 24%). This increases the information value of the grouping.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Only education makes a small difference among those who did not answer the motivation 
question or gave an answer that the interviewers could not interpret: 6% of the voters with 
university education did not answer the motivation question and 14% gave an 
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undeterminable motivation, against 11% in each group at the other extreme, that of voters 
with only compulsory school education. Leaving out respondents whose motivation answer 
cannot be used from the sample for future analysis should not bias our results.  
Finally, regarding political preferences, voters who place themselves on the left belong 
more often to the Anticipatory voters and the Ideologues (30% each) than voters on the right 
(24% and 27% respectively). Left partisans seem to be the ones most concerned by future 
environmental degradation. Right partisans are a little more often allocated to the Myopic 
(33%) and the Selfish voters (12%) than voters on the left (28% and 8% resp.); hence, leftist 
voters seem to focus a little less on their own well-being than voters on the right when 
deciding on environmental projects. Voters in the centre and non-partisans are in between. 
 
4 The econometric model  
We use a logistic multilevel model where the dependent binary variable is approval or 
rejection of environmental proposals and where individual characteristics on level-1 are 
nested within contextual determinants on level-2. Where necessary, we re-coded the 
dependent variable so that the vote always represents a choice in favor of the environment. 
Most individual-level explanatory variables in the VOX database were contrast coded 
(dummy variables) with 0 being the reference category. This is the case for the variables 
“male” (0=female), “urban” (0=living in rural area), “car” (0=owns no car) and “latin” 
(0=living in German-speaking part of the country). Education is an ordinal variable scaled 
from 0 to 3 for compulsory school (reference category), apprenticeship (“apprentice”), high 
school diploma (“maturity”), and university degree (“university”). The reference category 
for the age-predictor is the group 18 to 29 years, with the other groups being 30-44, 45-59, 
and 60+. 
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The partisanship variable was based on two questions regarding party identification and 
self-positioning on a left-right scale. The multiplicity of political parties in Switzerland is 
reduced to three families: the conservative right (Swiss People’s Party, Swiss Democrats and 
other parties of the radical right), the moderate right (Christian Democrats, Radicals, 
Liberals and other small parties), and the left (Social Democrats, Greens, Workers Party and 
other small left parties).7 Voters who do not identify with a party but position themselves 
clearly on one side of the left-right scale are added to the corresponding category. We select 
the non-partisans as the reference category.  
The change in consumption climate from the preceding quarter is indicated by “ΔCC”; 
the indicator’s values were attributed to each voting weekend. It is based on the Swiss 
Consumer Confidence Survey held every three months in Switzerland among a 
representative sample of 1,000 citizens who are asked a total of nine questions about their 
consumption behavior in the near future and past (data from SECO/State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs).8 The price of gasoline is measured as a yearly average and deflated by 
the consumer price index (“gas price”). Both variables were standardized with mean 0 and 
standard deviation of 1 to facilitate comparison.9 
The difficulty of decision-making on a specific proposal is measured through a variable 
where respondents were asked whether they had found it rather hard or easy to make up their 
mind regarding the proposals on the ballot (“difficult”). The elite’s position on the proposals 
is measured by a dummy variable which defines votes supported unanimously 
(“consensus”). This was never the case for popular initiatives since in general they refer to 
claims by political outsiders or movements which are deemed too extreme by the established 
actors.10 In the time frame of this research only six out of 81 popular initiatives were 
accepted, three of those being included in our data set. As aforementioned, we also included 
a dummy variable for all votes pertaining to nuclear power (“nuclear”).  
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Hierarchical models have been used only rarely to examine the impact of geographical 
and other contextual characteristics on individuals’ voting choices (Jones, Johnston, and 
Pattie, 1992; Bühlmann, 2006; Sciarini, Bornstein, and Lanz, 2007). For the present purpose, 
a two-level logistic random intercept model is chosen. The model suits our hypotheses best 
as we can test for variances on the individual and contextual level since voters’ choices are 
influenced by their personal characteristics as well as by the context in which they are 
embedded (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). It means that we estimate an intercept that is 
constant for all voters in a particular referendum but randomly variable across the 36 
referendums. 
As the dependent variable in our multilevel model is discrete, either approval or refusal 
of environmental protection measures, we apply a logistic hierarchical regression. The 
model has the following structure: the lower-level consists of the individuals who are nested 
within the ballot proposals on level-2. The formal representation of the model follows 
closely Snijders and Boskers (1999: 207-226). Yij denotes support or refusal of an 
environmental proposal by individual i on level-1 nested in level-2 context j. Predictor 
variables are denoted by 1X  to rX  taking values hijx  (h = 1, ..., r). The logistic random 
intercept model expresses the logit of ijP , the probability of supporting the proposal, as a 
linear function of the explanatory variables and a random deviation jU 0  that depends on 
level-2 context 
logit ∑
=
++=
r
h
jhijhij UxP
1
00)( γγ   (1) 
The random deviations jU 0  are assumed to follow a Normal distribution with zero mean 
and a variance of 20τ . 
The hierarchical logistic regression can also be formulated as a threshold model where 
the dichotomous outcome Υ  is then conceived as the result of an underlying non-observed 
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continuous variable. The underlying variable is denoted by Y . We state that Y is 1, if Y  is 
larger than the threshold, and 0, if it is less than the threshold. As we are working with 
unobserved entities let the threshold be 0. Thus, for the unobserved variable Y  we have a 
random intercept model of the following form  
r
ij 0 h hij 0 j ij
h 1
x U R
=
Υ = γ + γ + +∑   (2) 
where the cumulative distribution function of the level-1 residual ijR  is a logistic function 
with mean 0 and variance of 29.33/2 ≈π . By assuming that ijR  has this distribution, (2) is 
equivalent to (1). We define a threshold model so as to be able to calculate the proportion of 
explained variance using McKelvey and Zavoina’s 2MZR . 
All models were estimated with the multilevel software package MLwiN using the 
Reweighted Iterative Generalised Least Squares (RIGLS) algorithm, 2nd order penalized 
quasi-likelihood (PQL) (Rasbash et al., 1993). 
 
5 Discussion of the results 
Single-level model 
The results for the single-level model confirm our hypotheses about the positive effects of 
higher education, urbanity and left partisanship. As can be seen from table 3, the direction of 
the signs and the statistical significance of the coefficients confirm our assumptions. The left 
and green partisans and those having attended university vote more strongly in favor of the 
proposals. The positive effect for women implies that gender does have an impact on green 
voting. We suspect that this could be linked to motherhood questions, whereby women 
might be more sensitive to of the consequences of resource depletion for our descendants. 
Urban dwellers, too, have a higher probability of accepting the ballot propositions whereas 
those possessing one (or several) private car(s) have a smaller probability of voting yes. The 
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predictor measuring people’s difficulty when making a choice is not statistically significant. 
In line with earlier studies, the age coefficients have a negative sign, suggesting that the 
older voters are less supportive of environmental policy (Thalmann, 2004; Bornstein and 
Lanz, in press). Furthermore, the probability of support for environmental policy in the 
French- and Italian-speaking regions is lower than in the German part of the country, an 
effect frequently observed in Swiss referendums (Kriesi, 1999).  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The single-level model in table 3 also includes the motivation groups, with the group of 
the Ideologues serving as the reference category. We observe that, compared to the 
Ideologues, the probability that Selfish voters and Cue-takers approve environmental 
proposals is weaker. The two groups representing sociotropic voting confirm our 
expectations partly: while voters reasoning in short-term cost-benefit terms are less likely to 
approve the proposals, the coefficient does not attain statistical significance for the 
Anticipatory voters. We will comment in more detail on these effects when discussing the 
full model below. However, it becomes clear that hypothesis 1 is not fully confirmed. 
Adding the motivation group indicator into the vote equations is mainly designed to 
better understand the consequences of belonging to those groups rather than to raise the 
predictive power of the model. Indeed, in separate tests not shown here, we found that the 
proportion of explained variance was only minimally smaller without the groups. There are 
only 32% of voters in favor of the environment in the Selfish group against 57% in the 
reference group of the Ideologues and 58% in the group of the Anticipatory voters. Thus, the 
clearly significant and very large negative coefficient for Selfish means that, when their 
personal characteristics are taken into account, voters who weigh the benefits and costs of 
environmental proposals for themselves tend to reject them more frequently than the 
Ideologues. The same is true for the Myopic voters, but in lesser magnitude. The 
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Anticipatory voters then react more positively to the proposals, although the difference is not 
statistically significant, a finding which is in line with the high percentage of yes-voters in 
that group. However, belonging to the Cue-takers leads to voting more often against the 
environment, which is most likely due to the lop-sided elite configuration for a majority of 
the ballot propositions: all initiatives and three referendums (a total of 24 out of the 36 
proposals under study) faced opposition by the national government, major employers’ 
organizations and the three liberal-conservative government parties.  
 
Two-level model 
Adding level-2 contextual explanatory variables allows testing our hypotheses on the 
economic and institutional effects on vote choice. The variables’ coefficients confirm our a 
priories. The results are displayed in table 3 as well. While the coefficients of the individual 
determinants hardly change, we note some mixed effects for the institutional and economic 
predictors. 
First, we note that only the coefficient for the oldest voters attains statistical significance 
and is negative, indicating that when contextual effects of the vote are accounted for, young 
and middle-aged voters are influenced less by their age. Furthermore, more complex 
proposals diminish the probability of voter approval, thus confirming earlier findings that 
projects which were not well understood by the electorate faced a tough challenge at ballots 
(Zaller, 1992; Sciarini, Bornstein, and Lanz, 2007). Furthermore, we note a positive effect 
for ballot propositions which gained unanimous support from the Swiss elites. Inversely, this 
implies that the left, which in environmental referendums always opposes the established 
parties and organizations in the center and on the right, has great troubles passing green 
ballots if it does not receive support from the bourgeois parties, organized business and 
employers’ organizations. 
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The two measures of current economic conditions, the change in consumption climate 
and the deflated gasoline price, show mixed effects: the effect of a higher gas price is clear-
cut, namely it lowers the probability of approval. Our expectation that citizens are inclined 
to vote in favor of the projects when they perceive the change in the consumption climate 
positively is also confirmed. A caveat applies though: for the Selfish voters this is not the 
case (see below). Thus, all hypotheses pertaining to the context level are confirmed. It 
remains to see how the determinants fare when put in interaction with the separate 
motivation groups. 
As mentioned above, group membership must be regarded less as an element to increase 
the predictive power of the model, but rather in terms of discriminating what sort of 
considerations play a role for the voters’ choice after controlling for socio-structural 
characteristics. We note that the coefficients from one equation to the next remain robust but 
that there is improvement in that the coefficient for the Anticipatory voters is now 
statistically significant. Selfish voters, as expected in our hypotheses, have a greater 
probability of rejecting the proposals. This is also true for the Anticipatory voters; in 
accordance with our hypothesis, voters who are farsighted when making a decision will 
rather approve of the environmental proposals. This effect is statistically significant at the 
1%-level as are all effects for the motivation groups in the full model. Finally, voters 
following cues rather vote against the proposals, thus following the majority of the elites’ 
voting recommendations in our case. Thus, expectations outlined in hypothesis 1 can be 
confirmed for the full model whereas for the single-level model this is not the case. 
First, we test the pocketbook voting hypothesis by checking how the Selfish voters’ 
choice is influenced by the recent change in the consumption climate: the group’s already 
impressively lower probability of accepting environmental measures is further reduced. 
Thus, voters deciding about a proposal on the basis of its impact on their personal financial 
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situation are even more likely to reject environmental proposals in times of improving 
consumer prospects. This goes clearly against our assumptions of the beneficial effect of the 
change in the consumption climate. We might want to interpret this effect as a 
preponderance of material values, i.e. the increased availability of consumer goods when 
pocketbooks are full over immaterial environmental values. This finding is supported by 
Halbheer, Niggli, and Schmutzler (2006) who contend that voters, in their role as 
consumers, reject environmental proposals when it entails a restriction of their consumer 
sovereignty.  
Next, we test how Myopic voters react to changing gas prices. The interaction effect does 
not attain statistical significance suggesting that the burden of paying more for gas is equally 
constraining to all voters. This finding has direct repercussions on the above result, namely 
that voters react very sensitively to any kind of additional financial burden placed upon them 
(cf. Deacon and Shapiro, 1975). Thus self-interest seems to prevail for the pocketbook 
voters and macro-economic changes affect the entire electorate. 
Closely linked to the post-materialist hypothesis, the nuclear-dummy stands for the four 
initiatives asking for an exit from nuclear power (two in 1990; two in 2003). In each year 
one of the initiatives asked for a total exit while the second, voted upon on the same 
weekend, asked for a ten-year ban on further construction of nuclear power plants. The 
moratorium was accepted in 1990 but not in 2003, which is most likely due to the 
catastrophe in Chernobyl in 1986. We expect Anticipatory voters to be particularly sensitive 
to the preservation of a sound environment for their descendants and to be concerned about 
nuclear power and waste storage; the positive sign of the interaction effect confirms our 
expectations. Hence, while this group is more likely to approve anti-nuclear initiatives this 
does not hold true for the other groups as the coefficient for “nuclear” is statistically 
insignificant.  
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Lastly, we test whether voters who indicated that they follow the government’s or their 
family’s and friends’ advice are particularly sensitive to the elite’s opinion. It appears that 
the Cue-takers’ support decreases in mainstream situations, i.e. when elites back a proposal 
unanimously. This result is surprising. We are led to believe that the Swiss system, grounded 
in consociationalism, i.e. guaranteed group representation, raises the possibility of a protest 
vote in times when the elites tend towards a consensus-oriented position. In other words, 
these voters might be dissatisfied with the bargaining in parliament which led to a lackluster 
compromise and therefore refrain from supporting this type of coalition. Thus, in conclusion 
we must reject partly hypothesis 3 since Selfish voters did not react favorably to the increase 
in their consumer prospects nor did the Myopic voters react differently to the proposals 
compared to the rest of the electorate. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding a great number of studies focusing on the relationship between election 
outcomes and economic conditions, evidence on the impact of evaluations of the economy 
on referendum votes is still scarce. To fill this gap we tested how different voting models 
fare when put to the test on environmental referendums. We translated different models of 
individual decision-making into a typology of voters and allocated voters to the five groups 
based on the main reason they gave for approving or rejecting an environmental proposal. 
This approach has proven fruitful, not so much in increasing the predictive power of the 
model than in better understanding why context variables affect votes as they do. Moreover, 
we confirm that economic voting models can be applied very well to referendums and that 
they are highly beneficial to the understanding of environmental voting behavior.  
These results have some implications for environmental policymaking in developed 
countries. They show that policymakers ought to take into account people’s concerns about 
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the economy or their personal financial situation when presenting proposals to the public. As 
environmental proposals may well be cost-intensive and require heavy state intervention, 
new instruments such as emissions trading, or incentive taxes which provide full 
redistribution of revenues, must be pursued. We argue that these instruments – despite some 
troubling counter-evidence from Switzerland (Bornstein, 2007; Thalmann and Baranzini, 
2008) – may well be better suited to receive public support if major interest organizations 
and parties choose to support them, too. However, it does not suffice to work on the design 
of these proposals only; our results also seem to imply that it is conducive to the 
acceptability of the bills when people feel confident financially speaking. While it is hard to 
time the bills accordingly and rather launch them in times of economic upswing, they do 
stand a bigger change of being accepted when the global and national economy makes 
people feel like they can spare some of their taxes’ money on such post-material issues as 
the protection of our natural habitat and resources.  
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Table 1: Description of voter typology 
 
Name Characteristics Examples of responses 
Cue-takers Shortcuts to decision making; heuristic cues; imitation 
of better-informed citizens; follow party’s or 
government’s vote recommendation 
I followed family’s advice; cast my vote accordingly 
to the Federal Council; used my preferred party’s 
position as help; recommendation of friends/others 
Ideologues Simplistic and/or moral reasoning with ideological 
backdrop; usage of slogans; very pronounced pro- or 
contra-position: no concern for costs of proposals with 
regard to national economic conditions or public sector 
budget 
I am for the environment; important to protect the 
Alps; too bureaucratic; polluter-pays-principle; 
Confederation should stop spending 
Selfish voters Pocketbook voters; concerns for personal economic 
prospects and financial situation; personal cost-benefit 
analysis: prevalence of self-interest 
I pay enough taxes already; proposal goes too far; less 
congestion; modest financial contribution; personally 
harmed; I am for cost-transparency 
 27
Myopic voters Sociotropic voters; compare costs and benefits of 
proposals for a short time frame with regards to national 
economic condition; past economic experiences are 
decisive for vote 
Proposal is harmful to economic competitiveness; 
Confederation needs more money; proposal could 
endanger job security; no incentive to tourism; unequal 
distribution of costs on society 
Anticipatory voters Prospective sociotropic voters; evaluate consequences 
of proposal on future living conditions; immediate and 
long-term economic future crucial for choice 
I am concerned about the future/depletion of resources; 
concern about economic growth; promote renewable 
energy vs. renewables are not yet technologically 
ready; leave intact environment to descendants; we 
need more roads to cope with ever-increasing traffic 
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Table 2: Distribution of respondents according to voter typology in absolute numbers 
and percentages, according to vote decision 
 
 Yes  No  Total  
Ideologues 2,314 1,753   4,067  
Selfish voters 511  1,088   1,599  
Myopic voters 2,269  2,133   4,429  
Anticipatory voters 2,304  1,638   3,942  
Cue-takers 248  348  596  
Total 7,673 6,960   14,633  
 
 
 Yes  No Total  
Ideologues 30.2%  25.2%   27.8%  
Selfish voters 6.7%  15.6%   10.9%  
Myopic voters 29.9%  30.6%   30.3%  
Anticipatory voters 30.0%  23.5%   26.9%  
Cue-takers 3.2%  5.0%   4.1%  
Total 100% 100%  100% 
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Table 3: Support for environmental proposals at Swiss ballots; hierarchical logistic 
regression, RIGLS 2nd order PQL, N=14,633 
 
  Single-level model Two-level model 
Level-1 Level-2 Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant 0.751** (0.090)  0.066 (0.168)  
Age: 30-44 -0.098* (0.058)  -0.039 (0.063)  
Age: 45-59 -0.128* (0.059)  -0.105 (0.065)  
Age: 60+ -0.196** (0.060) -0.123* (0.067)  
Apprentice 0.161** (0.055)  0.152** (0.060)  
Maturity 0.301** (0.062)  0.310** (0.069)  
University 0.431** (0.076)  0.560** (0.086)  
Male -0.161** (0.037)  -0.239** (0.040)  
Urban 0.080* (0.037)  0.132** (0.041)  
Latin -0.297** (0.043)  -0.255** (0.047)  
Left 0.905** (0.047)  1.065** (0.053)  
Moderate -0.151** (0.045)  -0.188** (0.050)  
Conservative -0.657** (0.064)  -0.691** (0.071)  
Difficult -0.042 (0.041)  -0.128** (0.046)  
Car -0.718** (0.050)  -0.768** (0.055)  
Selfish -0.942** (0.065)  -1.051** (0.078)  
HAN -0.157** (0.046)  -0.288** (0.057)  
Anticipatory 0.055 (0.048) 0.297** (0.066)  
Cues -0.602** (0.093)  -0.492** (0.130)  
 ΔCC  0.278** (0.112)  
 Gas price  -0.236** (0.095)  
 Nuclear  0.348 (0.369)  
 Consensus  1.476** (0.212)  
 Selfish*ΔCC  -1.217** (0.066)  
 HAN*gas price  0.065 (0.048)  
 Anticipatory*nuclear  0.855** (0.160)  
 Cues*consensus  -0.432** (0.203)  
var )( 0 jU   0.314** (0.077) 
corr. pred. (cut value at 0.5) 64%  69% 
2
MZR  0.15 0.28 
** p≤ .01    * p≤ .05 
Extra-binomial distribution of two-level model: 1.009** 
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Figure 1: Voter typology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 For clarification purposes we describe the Cue-takers in a very narrow sense of the 
term, in that the other motivations groups which base their choice on evaluations of 
the economic situation are not defined as following a cue. We are aware of the danger 
of excluding reasoning based on perceptions of the economy from the cue-taking 
process. 
2 Scholars have even argued that personal self-interest, expressed for instance through 
voters’ opinion on their own future economic prospects, outweighs objective 
indicators of the state of the economy such as unemployment, inflation, interest and 
exchange rates (Sanders, 1991). 
3 Although several authors have argued that the difference between pocketbook and 
sociotropic voting is artifactual (Kramer, 1983) and that the pocketbook hypothesis 
has not been able to gain much hard evidence (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Kinder and 
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Kiewiet, 1979), we contend that the affective reactions to the two differ considerably 
as underlined by Conover and Feldman (1986). 
4 Due to missing data we were able to test only 36 of 38 projects in our model. See the 
remarks below for further details. 
5 An exception is Marquis (2004). He used the answers for a different purpose, 
though, namely to relate citizens’ answers in the survey to the arguments voiced by 
political parties and associations in political advertisements in Swiss newspapers. 
6 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) experienced similar problems when coding open-ended 
questions in the American NES, e.g. aggregation of issues which do not belong 
together. 
7 The partitioning of the party family into three categories is most common in 
research on Swiss voting behavior and in this respect we follow other scholars who 
use the same categorization (see e.g. Sciarini and Marquis, 2000; Kriesi, 2005). 
8 The Swiss Consumer Confidence Survey is comparable to the University of 
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index. The Swiss survey was first done in 1972. 
9 Measuring the objective state of the economy via the lagged unemployment rate was 
not possible due to Pearson’s correlation of r = 0.494 with the consumer confidence 
predictor; for GDP r = –0.280 (values significant at the 0.01-level, two-tailed test). 
10 Since the four biggest parties make up the seven-head government in Switzerland, 
the Federal Council, our variable also measures government support. That is, if the 
proposal received unanimous support by the political establishment it therefore also 
receives unanimous government support. Divergences by a member of the Federal 
Council with his party’s voting recommendation are extremely rare. 
